http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/120502_caspian.html

From The Wilderness, http://www.fromthewilderness.com/

Dec 5, 2002

Much Ado about Nothing -- Whither the Caspian Riches?

Over the Last 24 Months Hoped For Caspian Oil Bonanza Has Vanished With Each New Well Drilled -- Global Implications Are Frightening

by Dale Allen Pfeiffer, FTW Contributing Editor for Energy

[© Copyright, 2002, From The Wilderness Publications,
www.fromthewilderness.com. All rights reserved.
May be copied, distributed or posted on the Internet
for non-profit purposes only.]

[Ed. Note: The unfolding drama since 9-11-01 has been closely
paralleled by another, perhaps more threatening one. Evolving
more quietly, unmentioned and ignored by the major media, is a
coming hydrocarbon energy crisis of civilization-threatening
significance. Peak oil production is a reality, and it is
happening now. What was once heralded as an oil bonanza in
Central Asia -- and given life by ludicrous economic and
political assertions insisting that demand always creates
supply -- has proven itself to be an enormous bust. As Caspian
reserve estimates have been continually revised lower -- from
200 billion barrels, to 100 billion barrels, to around 20 billion
barrels -- the world has witnessed a dramatic shift in U.S.
foreign policy toward belligerent and unilateral doctrines
aimed at Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In the meantime, both politicians
and economists perpetuate a dangerous fallacy which says that
if you lock scientists up in a bank vault and give them enough
money and enough demand, they can produce a hot dog with mustard
and relish.

And conversion to hydrogen energy, as promoted by the Department
of Energy, is an impractical myth; a palliative meant to calm fears
rather than solve problems. Not until technologies are made available
which manufacture hydrogen at the point of use will hydrogen
technologies present even a viable partial solution for the
critical challenges posed by peak oil.

As FTW has said for more than a year, the "war which will not
end in our lifetimes" is proving itself to be a sequential war
to control the last remaining oil reserves on the planet,
especially those which have not yet peaked. - MCR]

Dec. 5, 2002, 16:00 PST (FTW) -- What ever happened to all the
talk of a new oil utopia in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia?
Word was that Caspian-Central Asian oil reserves would dwarf
the Middle East.

Yet, in the year since the Afghan War began, it seems that all
the rumors of Caspian riches have died out and the center of oil
interest has returned once again to Saudi Arabia and Iraq.
In his exclusive FTW interview
(http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/102302_campbell.html),
noted petroleum geologist Colin Campbell states that exploration
in the Caspian region has been very disappointing, with the
discoveries being much smaller than predicted and much of
the oil discovered being of poor quality.

But the Energy Information Agency (EIA) predicted that the
Caspian region would contain in excess of 200 billion barrels
of oil. So what is being said elsewhere about the results
of Caspian oil exploration?

At a recent event hosted by the Associated Press and the
Harriman Institute, Steven Mann, the director of the State
Department's Caspian Basin Energy Policy Office stated that
the Caspian Sea contains only 50 billion barrels of proven
reserves, a far cry from the EIA's projections. "Caspian Oil
represents 4 percent of the world's reserves. It will never
dominate the world's markets..."1

Likewise, a study published in PetroStrategies last July stated
that the Caspian Sea contains only 39.4 billion barrels of
proven oil reserves. The study, conducted by consultants from
Wood MacKenzie, criticized IEA figures for the region as being
severely inflated and unrealistic.2

The study states that oil production from the Caspian region
should peak at 3.8 million barrels per day (bpd) by 2015,
but be considerably less if the region remains politically
unstable. Future discoveries might result in a production
plateau extending beyond 2020.3

Only four fields are expected to make up 57 percent of production
by 2010. Of these four fields, three are located in Kazakhstan:
Tengiz, Karachaganak and Kashagan. The fourth field is the
Azeri-Chirac-Guneshli complex in Azerbaijan.

Total Azerbaijan reserves are estimated at 6.6 billion barrels.
However, drilling activity in the area has been disappointing,
indicating that oil reserves are likely dispersed in small pockets.4

The Tengiz field is estimated to contain between 6 and 9 billion
barrels of recoverable reserves. In 1993, Chevron paid $20 billion
to Kazakhstan for the right to develop this field, resulting in
the TengizChevrOil joint venture. Chevron expects production at
Tengiz to peak at 750,000 bpd by 2010. Azeri-Chirac-Guneshli
proven reserves are estimated at between 3 and 5 billion barrels.

They are being developed by the Azerbaijan International
Operating Company, and are expected to peak at 800,000 bpd
by the end of the decade.5 With reserves estimated at
10 billion barrels, the Kashagan field accounts for
25 percent of the regional total.6 This area is being
developed by the Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating
Company (Agip KCO, formerly OKIOC), lead by the Italian
oil major Agip.

Though Agip has been disappointed by exploration,
in June of 2002 they stated there might be as much as
38 billion in probable reserves yet to be found in the
Kashagan region.7

This author has been unable to locate data on the proven
Karachaganak reserves, but the literature would seem
to indicate that they are probably a little smaller
than the Tengiz reserves.

Even the EIA has revised its report on the Caspian region,
stating that although it is not another Middle East, it is...
"comparable to the North Sea in its hydrocarbon potential."8

Additional discoveries have been reported in recent months,
most notably by ExxonMobil9 and Nelson Resources.10 However,
none of these discoveries are of sufficient size to alter
the picture presented here.

In contrast, ExxonMobil does seem to be growing more cautious
about the region. ExxonMobil announced in June that it was
closing one of its Caspian offshore projects, the Oguz oil
field, due to the poor results of exploratory drilling.11

Abandon Ship

As this article went to press, there are several new reports
about oil investments in the Caspian region. ChevronTexaco
is withdrawing from the Tengizchevroil venture. Corporate
representatives and Kazakh government officials have offered
contradicting explanations for the failure of this enterprise.

The nominal reasons for the move involve financial disagreements
between ChevronTexaco and the Kazakh government. Disputes seem
to center around distribution and reinvestment of profits and
taxation.

Obviously, there are some hard feelings between Chevron and
the Kazakh government. But the contradictory explanations
offered by both sides may indicate that -- beneath all the
disputes -- the venture simply isn't profitable enough.12

The Tengiz field has proven very expensive to pump and deliver
to market. Aside from the engineering problems of extraction
and transport, Tengiz oil has a high sulfur content (as much
as 16 percent). Disposal of the waste sulfur has proven to be
a major headache.13

Furthermore, following on the announcement that Chevron was
shelving any further development of Tengiz, Kerr McGee has
announced its intention to sell off all of its interest in
various Caspian region projects, including mineral rights
in the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea shelf and its interest
in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (1.56 percent). The company
explained that it is seeking to rid itself of inactive profiles
and leave projects where it only holds a minority investment.14

Finally, Agip KCO is also reported to be considering a delay
in developing the Kashagan oil field.15 BP-Statoil has already
withdrawn from the project, leaving Italian Agip to soldier
on in the lead role. The Kashagan oil deposits also have a
high sulfur content, and the geology of the deposits indicates
that the oil may very well be contained in many small deposits
as opposed to one large platform.16

When all of this is added to ExxonMobil's withdrawal from
Azerbaijan and Russian Lukoil's recent announcement that
it intends to sell its interest in the Azeri-Chirac-Guneshli
complex, one has to wonder why all the major oil companies
are leaving the Caspian region.

What About the Pipelines?

There has been very little talk lately about the
trans-Afghanistan pipeline. This project seems to be
floundering due to continuing instability in Afghanistan,
and diminishing interest in the region's oil prospects.
It has also been reported that the Caspian Pipeline from
the Tengiz fields to the Russian port of Novorossiisk
has been hit by a number of high costs, including port
charges, taxes, and tariffs.17

The one pipeline which has remained in the news is the
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Estimated to cost about $2.9 billion,
this 1,090-mile pipeline network will link an existing
pipeline from Azerbaijan to the Turkish Mediterranean
Port of Ceyhan. To reach its destination, this pipeline
will have to cross high mountain ranges and traverse
territory occupied by disaffected Kurds, who may prove
hostile to the project.

Critics have questioned whether there are sufficient oil
reserves in the Caspian Sea to support the pipeline.
It is also possible that heavy tariffs will render the oil
transported along this pipeline uneconomical. ExxonMobil,
ChevronTexaco and Russia's Lukoil have all declined offers
to join the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) construction consortium.18

The project did receive a boost when BP announced that the
Azeri fields held more oil than previously believed and
would be sufficient to fill the link. Following this
announcement, ConocoPhillip's and French TotalFinaElf
both bought into the project.19 However, even with the
increased reserves in the Azari, the BTC pipeline would
have to rely on exports from Kazakhstan in order to be
viable over the long-term.

Kazakhstan has vacillated in its support for the pipeline.
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has stated that
he believes the best way to transfer Kazakh oil and gas
to market is via Turkmenistan and Iran.20 President Nazarbayev
has at various times indicated that Kazakhstan would pledge
oil to the BTC pipeline, but has backpedaled afterwards.

During a speech at the James A. Baker III Institute for
Public Policy at Rice University in Houston in late-December
2001, the Kazakh president stated that the efficiency of
the BTC pipeline was not proven and that oil companies
would choose the export route for Kashagan oil. This speech
reflects the opinions of the Agip KCO consortium, which
believes that the Iran route is the most cost-efficient
way to transport Kashagan oil to market.21

The Kazakh President finds himself in a very difficult position
due to U.S. opposition to a pipeline route through Iran. Kazakh
statements in favor of the BTC pipeline would properly be viewed
as attempts to placate the U.S.

Critics believe that political factors are blinding the U.S.
to financial risks in the pipeline deal. Not only would the
pipeline deny Iran a lucrative role as energy exporter,
it would also reduce dependence of Central Asian states
on Russian pipelines. Furthermore, the pipeline would bolster
regional economies in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.
The pipeline would help alleviate Turkey's current financial
depression.

A U.S. government source has stated, "The BTC has been
politically motivated, more than any other oil project
in the world."22

In light of recent reports of industry majors pulling
out of the region mentioned above, it is possible that
Kazakhstan will push for the Iranian route. Presently,
Agip is the only major left in the country, and they
certainly prefer the Iranian route.

Troubles with the Tengiz and Kashagan consortiums could
leave the BTC pipeline without enough oil to even make
the project worth completing. If plans are announced to
transport Kazakh oil through Iran, it will be very
interesting to see how the U.S. responds. There are
already influential voices urging Bush to go on to
Iran as soon as he is finished with Iraq.

Whether or not the project will prove viable, construction
of the BTC pipeline began on Sept. 8.23 On hand for the
start of construction was U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer
Abraham, who touted the project as "one of the most
important energy undertakings."24

One has to wonder whether part of the reason for U.S. interest
in the pipeline is an effort to destabilize OPEC. The Lebanese
Daily Star recently ran an editorial by Middle East Analyst
Patrick Seale which stated that Arab oil is currently worried
about the triple threat of U.S. imperialism, Russian and Caspian
imports, and hydrogen fuel cells.25 It is to be wondered
if Arab oil knows that the only portion of this triple threat
which really has teeth to it is U.S. imperialism.

Spencer Abraham's Hydrogen Dream

The media was all aglow recently with Spencer Abraham's
announcement that the U.S. now has a roadmap for making
the transition to a hydrogen economy. Secretary of Energy
Abraham announced the plan at the Global Forum on Personal
Transportation held in Dearborn, Mich. In his presentation,
he touted the line that hydrogen produced from renewable
resources can provide unlimited energy with no impact on
the environment. Secretary Abraham noted that the transition
to hydrogen would be a long-term process, which will require
the participation of both industry and government.

As a first step, in January 2002 Secretary Abraham, along
with officials from the automotive industry and Congress,
unveiled a FreedomCAR partnership to develop hydrogen fuel
cell vehicles.26

The National Hydrogen Energy Roadmap is available on the
internet in pdf form
(http://www.eren.doe.gov/hydrogen/pdfs/national_h2_roadmap.pdf).
This roadmap glows with positive energy. In all areas of
production, delivery, storage, conversion and applications,
the document beams about what we can achieve if we put our
minds to it, but inevitably winds up by saying that we have
a long way to go in order to make it a reality.

The document does mention the various challenges to each
area of fuel cell development, but makes little of the obstacles
and instead comes off sounding like a pep talk. Buried in the
text, they admit "The transition to a hydrogen economy...
could take several decades to achieve."27

The document speaks of wind, solar and geothermal
production, biomass, nuclear-thermo-chemical water
splitting, photoelectrochemical electrolysis, and
bioengineering. But they admit that all of these
processes will require a great deal more research.

The intention is to bootstrap the move by first developing
small "reformers" that will run on natural gas, propane,
methanol or diesel. But the authors admit that even this
technology requires further refinement for improved
reliability, longer catalyst life, and integration with
storage systems and fuel cells.

The document also includes a short list of people who are
in charge of various areas of development and transition.
The list includes: Frank Balog of Ford Motor Company,
Gene Nemanich of ChevronTexaco Technology Ventures,
Mike Davis of Avista Labs Energy, Art Katsaros of Air
Products and Chemicals Incorporated, Alan Niedzwiecki of
Quantum Technologies, Joan Ogden of Princeton University
Systems, and Jeff Serfass of The National Hydrogen
Association.28 This team will ensure that the new
technology remains firmly in the hands of the top
corporations.

The document is at least 80 percent public relations.
While admitting that in all areas there are serious
problems to be overcome before we will be able to make
a transition to hydrogen fuel cells, nowhere does this
document take a serious look at the obstacles. Instead,
this paper paints a pretty picture of our hydrogen future
and leaves the details to future research and investment.
So let us look at a few of the difficulties of developing
a hydrogen fuel cell economy.

First off, because hydrogen is the simplest element, it will
leak from any container, no mater how strong and no matter
how well insulated. For this reason, hydrogen in storage tanks
will always evaporate, at a rate of at least 1.7 percent
per day.29 Hydrogen is very reactive. When hydrogen gas
comes into contact with metal surfaces it decomposes into
hydrogen atoms, which are so very small that they can
penetrate metal. This causes structural changes that
make the metal brittle.30

Perhaps the largest problem for hydrogen fuel cell
transportation is the size of the fuel tanks. In gaseous
form, a volume of 238,000 litres of hydrogen gas is
necessary to replace the energy capacity of 20 gallons
of gasoline.31

So far, demonstrations of hydrogen-powered cars have
depended upon compressed hydrogen. Because of its low
density, compressed hydrogen will not give a car as useful
a range as gasoline.32 Moreover, a compressed hydrogen
fuel tank would be at risk of developing pressure leaks
either through accidents or through normal wear, and such
leaks could result in explosions.

If the hydrogen is liquefied, this will give it a density
of 0.07 grams per cubic centimeter. At this density,
it will require four times the volume of gasoline for
a given amount of energy. Thus, a 15-gallon gas tank
would equate to a 60-gallon tank of liquefied hydrogen.
Beyond this, there are the difficulties of storing liquid
hydrogen. Liquid hydrogen is cold enough to freeze air.
In test vehicles, accidents have occurred from pressure
build-ups resulting from plugged valves.33

Beyond this, there are the energy costs of liquefying
the hydrogen and refrigerating it so that it remains
in a liquid state. No studies have been done on the
energy costs here, but they are sure to further decrease
the Energy Return on Energy Invested (EROEI) of hydrogen
fuel.

A third option is the use of powdered metals to store the
hydrogen in the form of metal hydrides. In this case,
the storage volume would be little more than the volume
of the metals themselves.34 Moreover, stored in this form,
hydrogen would be far less reactive. However, as you can
imagine, the weight of the metals will make the storage
tank very heavy.

Now we come to the production of hydrogen. Hydrogen
does not freely occur in nature in useful quantities,
therefore hydrogen must be split from molecules, either
molecules of methane derived from fossil fuels or from
water.

Currently, most hydrogen is produced by the treatment
of methane with steam, following the formula:

CH4 (g) + H2O + e > 3H2(g) + CO(g).

The CO(g) in this equation is carbon monoxide gas, which
is a byproduct of the reaction.35

Not entered into this formula is the energy required
to produce the steam, which usually comes from the burning
of fossil fuels.

For this reason, we do not escape the production of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases. We simply transfer the
generation of this pollution to the hydrogen production
plants. This procedure of hydrogen production also results
in a severe energy loss. First we have the production of
the feedstock methanol from natural gas or coal at a
32 percent to 44 percent net energy loss. Then the steam
treatment process to procure the hydrogen will result
in a further 35 percent energy loss.36

It has often been pointed out that we have an inexhaustible
supply of water from which to derive hydrogen. However,
this reaction, 2H2O + e = 2H2(g) + O2(g), requires a substantial
energy investment per unit of water (286kJ per mole).37 This
energy investment is required by elementary principles of
chemistry and can never be reduced.

Several processes are being explored to derive hydrogen
from water, most notably electrolysis of water and thermal
decomposition of water. But the basic chemistry mentioned
above requires major energy investments from all of these
processes, rendering them unprofitable in terms of EROEI.

Much thought has been given to harnessing sunlight through
photovoltaic cells and using the resulting energy to split
water in order to derive hydrogen. The energy required to
produce 1 billion kWh (kilowatt hours) of hydrogen is
1.3 billion kWh of electricity.38 Even with recent advances
in photovoltaic technology, the solar cell arrays would be
enormous, and would have to be placed in areas with adequate
sunlight.

Likewise, the amount of water required to generate this
hydrogen would be equivalent to 5 percent of the flow of
the Mississippi River.39 As an example of a solar-to-hydrogen
set up, were Europe to consider such a transition, their
best hope would lie in erecting massive solar collectors
in the Saharan desert of nearby Africa. Using present
technology, only 5 percent of the energy collected at
the Sahara solar plants would be delivered to Europe.
Such a solar plant would probably cost 50 times as much
as a coal fired plant, and would deliver an equal amount
of energy.40 On top of this, the production of photovoltaic
cells has a very poor EROEI.

The basic problem of hydrogen fuel cells is that the second
law of thermodynamics dictates that we will always have to
expend more energy deriving the hydrogen than we will receive
from the usage of that hydrogen. The common misconception
is that hydrogen fuel cells are an alternative energy source
when they are not.

In reality, hydrogen fuel cells are a storage battery for
energy derived from other sources. In a fuel cell, hydrogen
and oxygen are fed to the anode and cathode, respectively,
of each cell. Electrons stripped from the hydrogen produce
direct current electricity which can be used in a DC electric
motor or converted to alternating current.41

Because of the second law of thermodynamics, hydrogen fuel
cells will always have a bad EROEI. If fossil fuels are used
to generate the hydrogen, either through the Methane-Steam
method or through Electrolysis of Water, there will be no
advantage over using the fossil fuels directly. The use of
hydrogen as an intermediate form of energy storage is
justified only when there is some reason for not using
the primary source directly.42 For this reason,
a hydrogen-based economy must depend on large-scale
development of nuclear power or solar electricity.

Therefore, the development of a hydrogen economy will
require major investments in fuel cell technology research
and nuclear or solar power plant construction. On top of
this, there is the cost of converting all of our existing
technology and machinery to hydrogen fuel cells. And all
of this will have to be accomplished under the economic
and energy conditions of post-peak fossil fuel production.

Based on all of this, I submit that Secretary of Energy
Spencer Abraham does indeed have ulterior motives for
his Hydrogen Energy Roadmap. First, I suggest that this
distant goal will help to pacify the public once they begin
to suffer from the effects of fossil fuel withdrawal.

Secondly, this project will allow the elite to transfer
more money from the general public to the pockets of the rich.

Third, in the words of Karl Davies, this proposal will deflect
a stock market collapse once news of declining oil production
becomes generally recognized.

Tied to this, it will brace stock prices of the auto corporations
and oil majors to help them survive well into the era of oil
depletion. And finally, the idea that we are working on a
transition from fossil fuels to a hydrogen-based economy
will help to destabilize OPEC, hopefully making it easier
to deal with that organization and the Arab oil states.

ENDNOTES:

1 Expert: No Guarantees in Caspian Oil The Associated Press
http://cgi.wn.com/?action=display&article=16535242&
template=worldnews/search.txt&index=recent

2 New Study says Caspian Oil Reserve Estimates are Exaggerated 05-06-02.
Source: Newsbase, quoting PetroStrategies.
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc22663.htm

3 New report comments on Caspian production outlook, 15-05-02.
Source: Newsbase.
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc22233.htm

4 Ibid.

5 Caspian Sea Region Analysis, 31-07-02. Energy Information Agency.
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspian.html

6 op. cit. See note 3.

7op. cit. See note 4.

8 Ibid.

9 ExxonMobil announces Kazakhstan Oil Discovery, IRVING, Texas,
Oct 10, 2002 (BUSINESS WIRE).
http://www.stockhouse.com/news/news.asp?tick=XOM&newsid=1349570

10 McDaniel Reserves Report Confirms Large Reserve at Alibekmola,
9-30-02.
http://www.stockhouse.com/news/news.asp?tick=NLG&newsid=1334563

11 Debate continues over Viability of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Construction,
Mark Berniker. 17-06-02. Source: EurasiaNet Business & Economics.
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc22871.htm

12 Kazakhstan: various explanations emerge for suspension of
oil project, Michael Lelyveld. 11/21/2002,
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/11/21112002150226.asp

13 Colin Campbell, personal communication.

14 Kerr McGee abandons Kazakhstan, 11/21/2002.
http://www.neftegaz.ru/english/lenta/show.php?id=29666

15 Op. Cit. See note 12.

16 Colin Campbell. Personal communication.

17 Op. Cit. See note 12.

18 Ibid.

19 ConocoPhillips to Buy Part of Pipeline, 30-10-02. Reuters.
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&
u=/nm/20021030/bs_nm/energy_bp_conocophillips_dc_1

20 Best way to transfer Kazakh oil and gas is via Turkmenistan and Iran,
27-04-02.
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc22024.htm

21 Analysis of the Caspian oil scene, 26-02-02.
Source: Financial Times LTD.
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc21293.htm

22 Op. Cit. See note 11.

23 Work on Big Caspian Oil Link Begins, Feb. 19, 2002. Reuters.
http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/news.asp?ArticleID=63499

24 US' Abraham in Azerbaijan for Start of Baku-Ceyhan Project,
18-09-02. Associated Press.
http://www.petroleumworld.com/story9276.htm

25 Eighty Years On: The Triple Threat being Posed to Arab Oil,
Patrick Seale. The Daily Star.
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/opinion/04_10_02_b.htm

26 Energy Secretary Abraham Gives Major Address on the Future of
Personal Transportation. Government Press release.
http://www.energy.gov/HQPress/releases02/novpr/pr02.htm

27 National Hydrogen Energy Roadmap, November 2002. United States
Department of Energy.
http://www.eren.doe.gov/hydrogen/pdfs/national_h2_roadmap.pdf

28 Ibid.

29 Hydrogen FAQ. Stanford University.
http://www.formal.stanford.edu/pub/jmc/progress/hydrogen.htm

30 "The World will End not with a Crash, but in a Whisper....",
by Ian Forrest, 10-03-98. University of California.
http://darwin.bio.uci.edu/~sustain/global/sensem/Forrest98.htm

31 Ibid.

32 Op. Cit. See note 23.

33 Ibid.

34 Op. Cit. See note 24.

35 Ibid.

36 Energetic Limits to Growth, Jay Hanson. Energy Magazine,
spring 1999. http://www.dieoff.com/page175.htm#_edn21

37 Op. Cit. See note 24.

38 Renewable Energy: Economic and Environmental Issues,
David Pimentel et al. BioScience, Vol. 44, No. 8, September 1994.
http://www.dieoff.com/page84.htm

39 Re: Hydrogen and Solar Energy Question, Message 25271,
EnergyResources List.
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/energyresources/message/25271
Also message 25245
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/energyresources/message/25245
and other messages in the string Hydrogen and Solar Energy Question.

40 An Outline of the Global Situation, the Sustainable Alternative
Society, and the Transition to it, Ted Trainer. University of N.S.W.
http://www.dieoff.com/page190.htm

41 Hydrogen & Fuel Cell Vehicles. California Consumer Energy Center.
http://www.consumerenergycenter.org/transportation/future/hydrogen.html

42 Op. Cit. See note 23.

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