See also this accompanying article which describes the context of the memo below:

The Secret Downing Street Memo
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
By DAVID MANNING

From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General,
Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS,
C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July
to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made.
It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment.
Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way
to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action.
Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and
land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or
overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up
with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor.
Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly
based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was
a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen
as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military
action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD.
But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the
policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and
no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's
record. There was little discussion in Washington of the
aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on
1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops,
a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad
from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation
plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000),
continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli.
Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning
even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing
in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option.
Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but
less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000,
perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering
from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes
of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been
taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for
military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning
30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell
this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take
military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But
the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours,
and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea
or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam
to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also
help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change
was not a legal base for military action. There were three
possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention,
or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the
base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago
would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference
politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the
UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense
that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were
different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the
political context were right, people would support regime
change. The two key issues were whether the military plan
worked and whether we had the political strategy to give
the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the
US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing
to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD
on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting
began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait.
Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with
a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy.
On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political
strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance,
we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue
to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors
back in only when he thought the threat of military action
was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted
UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early.
He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going
down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the
Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take
part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture
of US planning before we could take any firm decisions.
CDS should tell the US military that we were considering
a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether
funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed
military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background
on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of
countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member
states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would
consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)

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